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On
the
evening
of
the
twenty-sixth
of
August
,
Kutúzov
and
the
whole
Russian
army
were
convinced
that
the
battle
of
Borodinó
was
a
victory
.
Kutúzov
reported
so
to
the
Emperor
.
He
gave
orders
to
prepare
for
a
fresh
conflict
to
finish
the
enemy
and
did
this
not
to
deceive
anyone
,
but
because
he
knew
that
the
enemy
was
beaten
,
as
everyone
who
had
taken
part
in
the
battle
knew
it
.
But
all
that
evening
and
next
day
reports
came
in
one
after
another
of
unheard-of
losses
,
of
the
loss
of
half
the
army
,
and
a
fresh
battle
proved
physically
impossible
.
It
was
impossible
to
give
battle
before
information
had
been
collected
,
the
wounded
gathered
in
,
the
supplies
of
ammunition
replenished
,
the
slain
reckoned
up
,
new
officers
appointed
to
replace
those
who
had
been
killed
,
and
before
the
men
had
had
food
and
sleep
.
And
meanwhile
,
the
very
next
morning
after
the
battle
,
the
French
army
advanced
of
itself
upon
the
Russians
,
carried
forward
by
the
force
of
its
own
momentum
now
seemingly
increased
in
inverse
proportion
to
the
square
of
the
distance
from
its
aim
.
Kutúzov
's
wish
was
to
attack
next
day
,
and
the
whole
army
desired
to
do
so
.
But
to
make
an
attack
the
wish
to
do
so
is
not
sufficient
,
there
must
also
be
a
possibility
of
doing
it
,
and
that
possibility
did
not
exist
.
It
was
impossible
not
to
retreat
a
day
's
march
,
and
then
in
the
same
way
it
was
impossible
not
to
retreat
another
and
a
third
day
's
march
,
and
at
last
,
on
the
first
of
September
when
the
army
drew
near
Moscow
--
despite
the
strength
of
the
feeling
that
had
arisen
in
all
ranks
--
the
force
of
circumstances
compelled
it
to
retire
beyond
Moscow
.
And
the
troops
retired
one
more
,
last
,
day
's
march
,
and
abandoned
Moscow
to
the
enemy
.
For
people
accustomed
to
think
that
plans
of
campaign
and
battles
are
made
by
generals
--
as
anyone
of
us
sitting
over
a
map
in
his
study
may
imagine
how
he
would
have
arranged
things
in
this
or
that
battle
--
the
questions
present
themselves
:
Why
did
Kutúzov
during
the
retreat
not
do
this
or
that
?
Why
did
he
not
take
up
a
position
before
reaching
Filí
?
Why
did
he
not
retire
at
once
by
the
Kalúga
road
,
abandoning
Moscow
?
and
so
on
.
People
accustomed
to
think
in
that
way
forget
,
or
do
not
know
,
the
inevitable
conditions
which
always
limit
the
activities
of
any
commander
in
chief
.
The
activity
of
a
commander
in
chief
does
not
at
all
resemble
the
activity
we
imagine
to
ourselves
when
we
sit
at
ease
in
our
studies
examining
some
campaign
on
the
map
,
with
a
certain
number
of
troops
on
this
and
that
side
in
a
certain
known
locality
,
and
begin
our
plans
from
some
given
moment
.
A
commander
in
chief
is
never
dealing
with
the
beginning
of
any
event
--
the
position
from
which
we
always
contemplate
it
.
The
commander
in
chief
is
always
in
the
midst
of
a
series
of
shifting
events
and
so
he
never
can
at
any
moment
consider
the
whole
import
of
an
event
that
is
occurring
.
Moment
by
moment
the
event
is
imperceptibly
shaping
itself
,
and
at
every
moment
of
this
continuous
,
uninterrupted
shaping
of
events
the
commander
in
chief
is
in
the
midst
of
a
most
complex
play
of
intrigues
,
worries
,
contingencies
,
authorities
,
projects
,
counsels
,
threats
,
and
deceptions
and
is
continually
obliged
to
reply
to
innumerable
questions
addressed
to
him
,
which
constantly
conflict
with
one
another
.
Learned
military
authorities
quite
seriously
tell
us
that
Kutúzov
should
have
moved
his
army
to
the
Kalúga
road
long
before
reaching
Filí
,
and
that
somebody
actually
submitted
such
a
proposal
to
him
.
But
a
commander
in
chief
,
especially
at
a
difficult
moment
,
has
always
before
him
not
one
proposal
but
dozens
simultaneously
.
And
all
these
proposals
,
based
on
strategics
and
tactics
,
contradict
each
other
.
A
commander
in
chief
's
business
,
it
would
seem
,
is
simply
to
choose
one
of
these
projects
.
But
even
that
he
can
not
do
.
Events
and
time
do
not
wait
.
For
instance
,
on
the
twenty-eighth
it
is
suggested
to
him
to
cross
to
the
Kalúga
road
,
but
just
then
an
adjutant
gallops
up
from
Milorádovich
asking
whether
he
is
to
engage
the
French
or
retire
.
An
order
must
be
given
him
at
once
,
that
instant
.
And
the
order
to
retreat
carries
us
past
the
turn
to
the
Kalúga
road
.
And
after
the
adjutant
comes
the
commissary
general
asking
where
the
stores
are
to
be
taken
,
and
the
chief
of
the
hospitals
asks
where
the
wounded
are
to
go
,
and
a
courier
from
Petersburg
brings
a
letter
from
the
sovereign
which
does
not
admit
of
the
possibility
of
abandoning
Moscow
,
and
the
commander
in
chief
's
rival
,
the
man
who
is
undermining
him
(
and
there
are
always
not
merely
one
but
several
such
)
,
presents
a
new
project
diametrically
opposed
to
that
of
turning
to
the
Kalúga
road
,
and
the
commander
in
chief
himself
needs
sleep
and
refreshment
to
maintain
his
energy
and
a
respectable
general
who
has
been
overlooked
in
the
distribution
of
rewards
comes
to
complain
,
and
the
inhabitants
of
the
district
pray
to
be
defended
,
and
an
officer
sent
to
inspect
the
locality
comes
in
and
gives
a
report
quite
contrary
to
what
was
said
by
the
officer
previously
sent
;
and
a
spy
,
a
prisoner
,
and
a
general
who
has
been
on
reconnaissance
,
all
describe
the
position
of
the
enemy
's
army
differently
.
People
accustomed
to
misunderstand
or
to
forget
these
inevitable
conditions
of
a
commander
in
chief
's
actions
describe
to
us
,
for
instance
,
the
position
of
the
army
at
Filí
and
assume
that
the
commander
in
chief
could
,
on
the
first
of
September
,
quite
freely
decide
whether
to
abandon
Moscow
or
defend
it
;
whereas
,
with
the
Russian
army
less
than
four
miles
from
Moscow
,
no
such
question
existed
.
When
had
that
question
been
settled
?
At
Drissa
and
at
Smolénsk
and
most
palpably
of
all
on
the
twenty-fourth
of
August
at
Shevárdino
and
on
the
twenty-sixth
at
Borodinó
,
and
each
day
and
hour
and
minute
of
the
retreat
from
Borodinó
to
Filí
When
Ermólov
,
having
been
sent
by
Kutúzov
to
inspect
the
position
,
told
the
field
marshal
that
it
was
impossible
to
fight
there
before
Moscow
and
that
they
must
retreat
,
Kutúzov
looked
at
him
in
silence
.
