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Napoleon
,
riding
to
Valúevo
on
the
twenty-fourth
,
did
not
see
(
as
the
history
books
say
he
did
)
the
position
of
the
Russians
from
Utítsa
to
Borodinó
(
he
could
not
have
seen
that
position
because
it
did
not
exist
)
,
nor
did
he
see
an
advanced
post
of
the
Russian
army
,
but
while
pursuing
the
Russian
rearguard
he
came
upon
the
left
flank
of
the
Russian
position
--
at
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
--
and
unexpectedly
for
the
Russians
moved
his
army
across
the
Kolochá
.
And
the
Russians
,
not
having
time
to
begin
a
general
engagement
,
withdrew
their
left
wing
from
the
position
they
had
intended
to
occupy
and
took
up
a
new
position
which
had
not
been
foreseen
and
was
not
fortified
.
By
crossing
to
the
other
side
of
the
Kolochá
to
the
left
of
the
highroad
,
Napoleon
shifted
the
whole
forthcoming
battle
from
right
to
left
(
looking
from
the
Russian
side
)
and
transferred
it
to
the
plain
between
Utítsa
,
Semënovsk
,
and
Borodinó
--
a
plain
no
more
advantageous
as
a
position
than
any
other
plain
in
Russia
--
and
there
the
whole
battle
of
the
twenty-sixth
of
August
took
place
.
Had
Napoleon
not
ridden
out
on
the
evening
of
the
twenty-fourth
to
the
Kolochá
,
and
had
he
not
then
ordered
an
immediate
attack
on
the
redoubt
but
had
begun
the
attack
next
morning
,
no
one
would
have
doubted
that
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
was
the
left
flank
of
our
position
,
and
the
battle
would
have
taken
place
where
we
expected
it
.
In
that
case
we
should
probably
have
defended
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
--
our
left
flank
--
still
more
obstinately
.
We
should
have
attacked
Napoleon
in
the
center
or
on
the
right
,
and
the
engagement
would
have
taken
place
on
the
twenty-fifth
,
in
the
position
we
intended
and
had
fortified
.
But
as
the
attack
on
our
left
flank
took
place
in
the
evening
after
the
retreat
of
our
rear
guard
(
that
is
,
immediately
after
the
fight
at
Gridnëva
)
,
and
as
the
Russian
commanders
did
not
wish
,
or
were
not
in
time
,
to
begin
a
general
engagement
then
on
the
evening
of
the
twenty-fourth
,
the
first
and
chief
action
of
the
battle
of
Borodinó
was
already
lost
on
the
twenty-fourth
,
and
obviously
led
to
the
loss
of
the
one
fought
on
the
twenty-sixth
.
After
the
loss
of
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
,
we
found
ourselves
on
the
morning
of
the
twenty-fifth
without
a
position
for
our
left
flank
,
and
were
forced
to
bend
it
back
and
hastily
entrench
it
where
it
chanced
to
be
.
Not
only
was
the
Russian
army
on
the
twenty-sixth
defended
by
weak
,
unfinished
entrenchments
,
but
the
disadvantage
of
that
position
was
increased
by
the
fact
that
the
Russian
commanders
--
not
having
fully
realized
what
had
happened
,
namely
the
loss
of
our
position
on
the
left
flank
and
the
shifting
of
the
whole
field
of
the
forthcoming
battle
from
right
to
left
--
maintained
their
extended
position
from
the
village
of
Nóvoe
to
Utítsa
,
and
consequently
had
to
move
their
forces
from
right
to
left
during
the
battle
.
So
it
happened
that
throughout
the
whole
battle
the
Russians
opposed
the
entire
French
army
launched
against
our
left
flank
with
but
half
as
many
men
.
(
Poniatowski
's
action
against
Utítsa
,
and
Uvárov
's
on
the
right
flank
against
the
French
,
were
actions
distinct
from
the
main
course
of
the
battle
)
So
the
battle
of
Borodinó
did
not
take
place
at
all
as
(
in
an
effort
to
conceal
our
commanders
'
mistakes
even
at
the
cost
of
diminishing
the
glory
due
to
the
Russian
army
and
people
)
it
has
been
described
.
The
battle
of
Borodinó
was
not
fought
on
a
chosen
and
entrenched
position
with
forces
only
slightly
weaker
than
those
of
the
enemy
,
but
,
as
a
result
of
the
loss
of
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
,
the
Russians
fought
the
battle
of
Borodinó
on
an
open
and
almost
unentrenched
position
,
with
forces
only
half
as
numerous
as
the
French
;
that
is
to
say
,
under
conditions
in
which
it
was
not
merely
unthinkable
to
fight
for
ten
hours
and
secure
an
indecisive
result
,
but
unthinkable
to
keep
an
army
even
from
complete
disintegration
and
flight
.
On
the
morning
of
the
twenty-fifth
Pierre
was
leaving
Mozháysk
.
At
the
descent
of
the
high
steep
hill
,
down
which
a
winding
road
led
out
of
the
town
past
the
cathedral
on
the
right
,
where
a
service
was
being
held
and
the
bells
were
ringing
,
Pierre
got
out
of
his
vehicle
and
proceeded
on
foot
.
Behind
him
a
cavalry
regiment
was
coming
down
the
hill
preceded
by
its
singers
.
Coming
up
toward
him
was
a
train
of
carts
carrying
men
who
had
been
wounded
in
the
engagement
the
day
before
.
The
peasant
drivers
,
shouting
and
lashing
their
horses
,
kept
crossing
from
side
to
side
.
The
carts
,
in
each
of
which
three
or
four
wounded
soldiers
were
lying
or
sitting
,
jolted
over
the
stones
that
had
been
thrown
on
the
steep
incline
to
make
it
something
like
a
road
.
The
wounded
,
bandaged
with
rags
,
with
pale
cheeks
,
compressed
lips
,
and
knitted
brows
,
held
on
to
the
sides
of
the
carts
as
they
were
jolted
against
one
another
.
Almost
all
of
them
stared
with
naïve
,
childlike
curiosity
at
Pierre
's
white
hat
and
green
swallow-tail
coat
.
Pierre
's
coachman
shouted
angrily
at
the
convoy
of
wounded
to
keep
to
one
side
of
the
road
.
The
cavalry
regiment
,
as
it
descended
the
hill
with
its
singers
,
surrounded
Pierre
's
carriage
and
blocked
the
road
.
Pierre
stopped
,
being
pressed
against
the
side
of
the
cutting
in
which
the
road
ran
.
The
sunshine
from
behind
the
hill
did
not
penetrate
into
the
cutting
and
there
it
was
cold
and
damp
,
but
above
Pierre
's
head
was
the
bright
August
sunshine
and
the
bells
sounded
merrily
.
One
of
the
carts
with
wounded
stopped
by
the
side
of
the
road
close
to
Pierre
.
The
driver
in
his
bast
shoes
ran
panting
up
to
it
,
placed
a
stone
under
one
of
its
tireless
hind
wheels
,
and
began
arranging
the
breech-band
on
his
little
horse
.
