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On
the
twenty-fourth
the
weather
cleared
up
after
a
spell
of
rain
,
and
after
dinner
Pierre
left
Moscow
.
When
changing
horses
that
night
in
Perkhúshkovo
,
he
learned
that
there
had
been
a
great
battle
that
evening
.
(
This
was
the
battle
of
Shevárdino
.
)
He
was
told
that
there
in
Perkhúshkovo
the
earth
trembled
from
the
firing
,
but
nobody
could
answer
his
questions
as
to
who
had
won
.
At
dawn
next
day
Pierre
was
approaching
Mozháysk
.
Every
house
in
Mozháysk
had
soldiers
quartered
in
it
,
and
at
the
hostel
where
Pierre
was
met
by
his
groom
and
coachman
there
was
no
room
to
be
had
.
It
was
full
of
officers
Everywhere
in
Mozháysk
and
beyond
it
,
troops
were
stationed
or
on
the
march
.
Cossacks
,
foot
and
horse
soldiers
,
wagons
,
caissons
,
and
cannon
were
everywhere
.
Pierre
pushed
forward
as
fast
as
he
could
,
and
the
farther
he
left
Moscow
behind
and
the
deeper
he
plunged
into
that
sea
of
troops
the
more
was
he
overcome
by
restless
agitation
and
a
new
and
joyful
feeling
he
had
not
experienced
before
.
It
was
a
feeling
akin
to
what
he
had
felt
at
the
Slobóda
Palace
during
the
Emperor
's
visit
--
a
sense
of
the
necessity
of
undertaking
something
and
sacrificing
something
.
He
now
experienced
a
glad
consciousness
that
everything
that
constitutes
men
's
happiness
--
the
comforts
of
life
,
wealth
,
even
life
itself
--
is
rubbish
it
is
pleasant
to
throw
away
,
compared
with
something
...
With
what
?
Pierre
could
not
say
,
and
he
did
not
try
to
determine
for
whom
and
for
what
he
felt
such
particular
delight
in
sacrificing
everything
.
He
was
not
occupied
with
the
question
of
what
to
sacrifice
for
;
the
fact
of
sacrificing
in
itself
afforded
him
a
new
and
joyous
sensation
.
On
the
twenty-fourth
of
August
the
battle
of
the
Shevárdino
Redoubt
was
fought
,
on
the
twenty-fifth
not
a
shot
was
fired
by
either
side
,
and
on
the
twenty-sixth
the
battle
of
Borodinó
itself
took
place
.
Why
and
how
were
the
battles
of
Shevárdino
and
Borodinó
given
and
accepted
?
Why
was
the
battle
of
Borodinó
fought
?
There
was
not
the
least
sense
in
it
for
either
the
French
or
the
Russians
.
Its
immediate
result
for
the
Russians
was
,
and
was
bound
to
be
,
that
we
were
brought
nearer
to
the
destruction
of
Moscow
--
which
we
feared
more
than
anything
in
the
world
;
and
for
the
French
its
immediate
result
was
that
they
were
brought
nearer
to
the
destruction
of
their
whole
army
--
which
they
feared
more
than
anything
in
the
world
.
What
the
result
must
be
was
quite
obvious
,
and
yet
Napoleon
offered
and
Kutúzov
accepted
that
battle
.
If
the
commanders
had
been
guided
by
reason
,
it
would
seem
that
it
must
have
been
obvious
to
Napoleon
that
by
advancing
thirteen
hundred
miles
and
giving
battle
with
a
probability
of
losing
a
quarter
of
his
army
,
he
was
advancing
to
certain
destruction
,
and
it
must
have
been
equally
clear
to
Kutúzov
that
by
accepting
battle
and
risking
the
loss
of
a
quarter
of
his
army
he
would
certainly
lose
Moscow
.
For
Kutúzov
this
was
mathematically
clear
,
as
it
is
that
if
when
playing
draughts
I
have
one
man
less
and
go
on
exchanging
,
I
shall
certainly
lose
,
and
therefore
should
not
exchange
.
When
my
opponent
has
sixteen
men
and
I
have
fourteen
,
I
am
only
one
eighth
weaker
than
he
,
but
when
I
have
exchanged
thirteen
more
men
he
will
be
three
times
as
strong
as
I
am
.
Before
the
battle
of
Borodinó
our
strength
in
proportion
to
the
French
was
about
as
five
to
six
,
but
after
that
battle
it
was
little
more
than
one
to
two
:
previously
we
had
a
hundred
thousand
against
a
hundred
and
twenty
thousand
;
afterwards
little
more
than
fifty
thousand
against
a
hundred
thousand
.
Yet
the
shrewd
and
experienced
Kutúzov
accepted
the
battle
,
while
Napoleon
,
who
was
said
to
be
a
commander
of
genius
,
gave
it
,
losing
a
quarter
of
his
army
and
lengthening
his
lines
of
communication
still
more
.
If
it
is
said
that
he
expected
to
end
the
campaign
by
occupying
Moscow
as
he
had
ended
a
previous
campaign
by
occupying
Vienna
,
there
is
much
evidence
to
the
contrary
.
Napoleon
's
historians
themselves
tell
us
that
from
Smolénsk
onwards
he
wished
to
stop
,
knew
the
danger
of
his
extended
position
,
and
knew
that
the
occupation
of
Moscow
would
not
be
the
end
of
the
campaign
,
for
he
had
seen
at
Smolénsk
the
state
in
which
Russian
towns
were
left
to
him
,
and
had
not
received
a
single
reply
to
his
repeated
announcements
of
his
wish
to
negotiate
.
In
giving
and
accepting
battle
at
Borodinó
,
Kutúzov
acted
involuntarily
and
irrationally
.
But
later
on
,
to
fit
what
had
occurred
,
the
historians
provided
cunningly
devised
evidence
of
the
foresight
and
genius
of
the
generals
who
,
of
all
the
blind
tools
of
history
were
the
most
enslaved
and
involuntary
.
The
ancients
have
left
us
model
heroic
poems
in
which
the
heroes
furnish
the
whole
interest
of
the
story
,
and
we
are
still
unable
to
accustom
ourselves
to
the
fact
that
for
our
epoch
histories
of
that
kind
are
meaningless
.
On
the
other
question
,
how
the
battle
of
Borodinó
and
the
preceding
battle
of
Shevárdino
were
fought
,
there
also
exists
a
definite
and
well-known
,
but
quite
false
,
conception
.
All
the
historians
describe
the
affair
as
follows
:
