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The
actors
of
1812
have
long
since
left
the
stage
,
their
personal
interests
have
vanished
leaving
no
trace
,
and
nothing
remains
of
that
time
but
its
historic
results
.
Providence
compelled
all
these
men
,
striving
to
attain
personal
aims
,
to
further
the
accomplishment
of
a
stupendous
result
no
one
of
them
at
all
expected
--
neither
Napoleon
,
nor
Alexander
,
nor
still
less
any
of
those
who
did
the
actual
fighting
.
The
cause
of
the
destruction
of
the
French
army
in
1812
is
clear
to
us
now
.
No
one
will
deny
that
that
cause
was
,
on
the
one
hand
,
its
advance
into
the
heart
of
Russia
late
in
the
season
without
any
preparation
for
a
winter
campaign
and
,
on
the
other
,
the
character
given
to
the
war
by
the
burning
of
Russian
towns
and
the
hatred
of
the
foe
this
aroused
among
the
Russian
people
.
But
no
one
at
the
time
foresaw
(
what
now
seems
so
evident
)
that
this
was
the
only
way
an
army
of
eight
hundred
thousand
men
--
the
best
in
the
world
and
led
by
the
best
general
--
could
be
destroyed
in
conflict
with
a
raw
army
of
half
its
numerical
strength
,
and
led
by
inexperienced
commanders
as
the
Russian
army
was
.
Not
only
did
no
one
see
this
,
but
on
the
Russian
side
every
effort
was
made
to
hinder
the
only
thing
that
could
save
Russia
,
while
on
the
French
side
,
despite
Napoleon
's
experience
and
so-called
military
genius
,
every
effort
was
directed
to
pushing
on
to
Moscow
at
the
end
of
the
summer
,
that
is
,
to
doing
the
very
thing
that
was
bound
to
lead
to
destruction
.
In
historical
works
on
the
year
1812
French
writers
are
very
fond
of
saying
that
Napoleon
felt
the
danger
of
extending
his
line
,
that
he
sought
a
battle
and
that
his
marshals
advised
him
to
stop
at
Smolénsk
,
and
of
making
similar
statements
to
show
that
the
danger
of
the
campaign
was
even
then
understood
.
Russian
authors
are
still
fonder
of
telling
us
that
from
the
commencement
of
the
campaign
a
Scythian
war
plan
was
adopted
to
lure
Napoleon
into
the
depths
of
Russia
,
and
this
plan
some
of
them
attribute
to
Pfuel
,
others
to
a
certain
Frenchman
,
others
to
Toll
,
and
others
again
to
Alexander
himself
--
pointing
to
notes
,
projects
,
and
letters
which
contain
hints
of
such
a
line
of
action
.
But
all
these
hints
at
what
happened
,
both
from
the
French
side
and
the
Russian
,
are
advanced
only
because
they
fit
in
with
the
event
.
Had
that
event
not
occurred
these
hints
would
have
been
forgotten
,
as
we
have
forgotten
the
thousands
and
millions
of
hints
and
expectations
to
the
contrary
which
were
current
then
but
have
now
been
forgotten
because
the
event
falsified
them
.
There
are
always
so
many
conjectures
as
to
the
issue
of
any
event
that
however
it
may
end
there
will
always
be
people
to
say
:
"
I
said
then
that
it
would
be
so
,
"
quite
forgetting
that
amid
their
innumerable
conjectures
many
were
to
quite
the
contrary
effect
.
Conjectures
as
to
Napoleon
's
awareness
of
the
danger
of
extending
his
line
,
and
(
on
the
Russian
side
)
as
to
luring
the
enemy
into
the
depths
of
Russia
,
are
evidently
of
that
kind
,
and
only
by
much
straining
can
historians
attribute
such
conceptions
to
Napoleon
and
his
marshals
,
or
such
plans
to
the
Russian
commanders
.
All
the
facts
are
in
flat
contradiction
to
such
conjectures
.
During
the
whole
period
of
the
war
not
only
was
there
no
wish
on
the
Russian
side
to
draw
the
French
into
the
heart
of
the
country
,
but
from
their
first
entry
into
Russia
everything
was
done
to
stop
them
.
And
not
only
was
Napoleon
not
afraid
to
extend
his
line
,
but
he
welcomed
every
step
forward
as
a
triumph
and
did
not
seek
battle
as
eagerly
as
in
former
campaigns
,
but
very
lazily
.
At
the
very
beginning
of
the
war
our
armies
were
divided
,
and
our
sole
aim
was
to
unite
them
,
though
uniting
the
armies
was
no
advantage
if
we
meant
to
retire
and
lure
the
enemy
into
the
depths
of
the
country
.
Our
Emperor
joined
the
army
to
encourage
it
to
defend
every
inch
of
Russian
soil
and
not
to
retreat
.
The
enormous
Drissa
camp
was
formed
on
Pfuel
's
plan
,
and
there
was
no
intention
of
retiring
farther
.
The
Emperor
reproached
the
commanders
in
chief
for
every
step
they
retired
.
He
could
not
bear
the
idea
of
letting
the
enemy
even
reach
Smolénsk
,
still
less
could
he
contemplate
the
burning
of
Moscow
,
and
when
our
armies
did
unite
he
was
displeased
that
Smolénsk
was
abandoned
and
burned
without
a
general
engagement
having
been
fought
under
its
walls
.
So
thought
the
Emperor
,
and
the
Russian
commanders
and
people
were
still
more
provoked
at
the
thought
that
our
forces
were
retreating
into
the
depths
of
the
country
.
Napoleon
having
cut
our
armies
apart
advanced
far
into
the
country
and
missed
several
chances
of
forcing
an
engagement
.
In
August
he
was
at
Smolénsk
and
thought
only
of
how
to
advance
farther
,
though
as
we
now
see
that
advance
was
evidently
ruinous
to
him
.
